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I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, poor persons demanding micro loans which they need to make small 
investments for their self-employment opportunities, were mostly excluded from the access to 
credit market. As a consequence, they were either unable to be self-employed, or, if they had 
started their own business, suffered from under-financing and were not able to expand their 
business. On a macro-level, the lack of financial capital for small and micro businesses has 
been a major obstacle to the small-scale private sector not only in developing, but also in 
transition and, to a smaller extent, in industrialized economies. 
The reasons of exclusion contain a risk and a cost component: 1) All persons without 
collateral are unable to signal their creditworthiness so that banks which secure loans by 
collateral, are incapable to assess their risk. 2) Given that persons running a micro-business 
mostly ask for small loan sizes, it is not feasible in the usual banking system to substitute the 
additional screening and monitoring efforts for collateral. The added cost then surpasses the 
potential revenues and, thus, most institutional lenders using conventional financial 
technologies consider the disbursement of micro credits highly inefficient. 
During the last three decades, major progress in this sector has been made. The proponents of 
the so-called micro-finance paradigm showed that the problems can be addressed by creating 
and implementing new micro-lending technologies. These proved to work quite efficiently in 
many countries, by giving access to credit to those persons who now became able to signal 
their creditworthiness at lower cost. The main progress of the Micro Finance Institutions 
(MFIs) is that they have developed mechanisms where borrowers form groups which jointly 
share liability for loan delinquencies or default. The incentives set by such contracts enable 
the lender to reduce his cost of screening, monitoring and enforcement.2 In the meantime, 
many variations based on the peer group mechanism have been developed drawing on each 
country’s institutional setting.3 Nevertheless, all mechanisms have in common that there is 
not one single variable (such as collateral) but a combined set of incentives, as the limited or 
unlimited liability of each borrower for all other borrowers of the group, the repeated (group) 
access to further loans if previous ones have been repaid by all group members and the 
dynamic incentives of increasing loans. 
Recent theoretical research (for an overview, cf. Morduch [1999a]) has explained that high 
repayment rates are likely because the combined mechanism induces borrowers to self-select 
in homogenous groups of low risks before the loan contract is concluded and it induces 
                                                 
2. Besides the group lending schemes there is a second type of contract also used by MFIs, namely the 
individual micro-lending contract (cf. Armendariz and Morduch [2000]) which combines the traditional 
“collateral-based” technology with new elements. The present paper will deal only with group contracts. (For an 
empirical discussion of the key factors of individual lending schemes, see Vigenina and Kritikos [2004].) 
3. In particular, the extent to which a certain kind of liability between the members of a peer group can be 
enforced by the lender depends on the legal setting and the degree of legal enforcement.    4
several peer measures within in the group of borrowers if anybody defaults. However, doubts 
have been raised whether the mechanism is functioning as advertised in these models. Jain 
[1996, 2003] asserts that factors not considered in the models, like the enforcement process of 
the loan officers, might be the true reason for the MFIs’ success. 
Evidence from the field shows that group contracts may work perfectly leading to repayment 
rates of slightly less than 100%. At times repayment rates dropped to less than 30%, leading 
to a breakdown of the corresponding MFI. Positive examples were demonstrated at Fundusz 
Micro (Poland), at BancoSol (Bolivia), at Constanta (Georgia) and last but not least at the 
trend setting Grameen Bank (Bangladesh),4 even though there is lot of discussion regarding 
the repayment rates of the latter institution (see Morduch [1999b] and Woolcock [1999]). 
Negative examples were observed in Albania, Malaysia, India and several African countries. 
The experience from the breakdowns revealed that several prerequisites have to be fulfilled to 
induce high repayment rates: a) the focus on the target group - mostly borrowers who have no 
access to the regular banking system should be accepted, otherwise the non-refinancing threat 
will not be meaningful; b) the deliberate grouping by its eventual members and not by the 
loan officers to ensure mutual responsibility for the joint-liability; c) the restriction of the 
group size; and d) the enforcement of the group liability mechanism - exclusion from access 
to further loans must be made real to the complete group if it fails to repay all loans.5 
There is less evidence which incentives induce loan repayment when these prerequisites are 
met. Therefore, this paper examines what factors improve and what factors have no 
measurable or even a counterproductive effect on loan repayment. Furthermore, the paper 
analyzes to what extent the theoretically predicted multi-stage process between borrowers 
takes place, and to what extent other actions of the loan officers secure the loan repayment. 
The data for our tests was obtained through questionnaires and was completed in cooperation 
with the MFI “Constanta” in Georgia during the winter term of 2001/2002. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the group-lending 
methodology of Constanta. In section three, a brief review is given of the group-lending 
mechanism to the extent that is relevant for the present research. In section four, the empirical 
results are presented, showing which factors influence the repayment behavior. Section five 
concludes and derives some policy recommendations, unfolding that the main problems of the 
joint-liability approach, the mismatching problem and the domino effect, can be addressed by 
sufficiently restricting the long-term dynamic incentives. 
                                                 
4. For a description of the lending schemes of the Grameen Bank, see Hashemi and Schuler [1997], for 
BancoSol, see Navajas et al. [2000], for Fundusz Micro, see Nagarajan [2000]. The Microlending organization 
“Constanta“ will be described in the present paper. An overview over most existing institutions is provided by 
the Micro Credit Summit [2002]. 
5. cf. Gibbons and Kasim [1990], Krahnen and Schmidt [1994], Sharma and Zeller [1997], Kritikos [1999], 
Ghatak and Guinnane [1999], and Woolcock [1999] for a discussion of these four prerequisites.   5
II. GROUP LENDING AT THE MFI CONSTANTA IN GEORGIA 
The Lending Methodology: Since October 1997, Constanta provides micro-loans to groups 
with no collateral requirements, targeting mostly poor micro-entrepreneurs. The lending 
technology consists of repeated loans with a term of 4 months which have to be repaid in 
weekly installments. Loans are granted to groups of 7 to 15 clients. Group members guarantee 
each others’ loans, and all of the group’s loans must be repaid on time to have access to 
subsequent loans. The initial loan size is 100 to 200 Georgian Lari (GEL) (i.e. 50 – 100 Euro). 
Loans increase in each cycle by not more than 50% of the previous loan amount. The MFI 
charges an interest rate of 4% (flat) per month. For a loan of 100 GEL, with a loan term of 4 
months, and an interest rate of 4 percent per month the total interest payment is 16 GEL. The 
total amount of 116 GEL should be repaid in weekly installments of 7.25 GEL each. Eligible 
to borrow from Constanta are persons who are over 18 years old, have started their business 
and possess at least six months of working experience.6 
The Lending Procedure and Enforcement Measures: Clients form their groups deliberately. 
No family members are allowed, since earlier experience showed that close relatives were not 
willing to impose social sanctions. Loan officers do not intervene in the process of group 
building. When a group has been formed, members meet with a loan officer and attend five 
training meetings and the loan officer visits each group member’s business to evaluate the his 
financial situation. The process between first meeting and loan disbursement takes about 2 
weeks. After the loan disbursement, there are no further official meetings. To show their 
presence, loan officers make random visits to their borrowers. Further loans are disbursed 
(based on a highly standardized procedure) when the entire group has paid back its previous 
loans and presented its actual financial results. 
Payments are considered delinquent if one currency unit is not repaid on time. In this case, the 
delinquent member has to pay 1% of the late installment as a fine. In addition, after the first 
late payment, group members are allowed to increase their maximum loan size by only GEL 
25 (instead of 50%) in the next cycle. The second late payment reduces the increase to GEL 
15. After more than two late payments, the loan size will not increase at all. If arrears occur, 
loan officers become permanently present in the group and exert high pressure on all 
members of the delinquent group until the complete installment has been collected. In fact, at 
the branch of Batumi where the questionnaire was conducted, only two groups refused to pay 
for a delinquent borrower. These groups were excluded from access to further loans and sued. 
In this context it should be emphasized that the borrowers are also allowed to exclude single 
members of their group if these proved to be defaulters. 
                                                 
6. One special setting of Georgia needs to be emphasized. After a complete breakdown of the financial system, 
borrowers are reluctant to deposit savings in any kind of banking organization. Therefore, Constanta abandoned 
the use of the mandatory savings component which is a usual incentive instrument of MFIs.   6
Branch Performance: Constanta operates in the urban areas of Tbilisi, Gori, Batumi, and 
Marneuli. The visited branch of Batumi has more than 2.000 clients and was in 2002 
operationally self-sufficient. The number of clients reached by Constanta’s loan officers is 
approximately 400 per officer which corresponds to the international standards (cf. Woller 
and Schreiner [2002]). The loan officers are offered a performance-based wage comprising a 
fixed amount and a bonus contingent on individual performance, calculated by a formula that 
combines stock, flow indicators and strategic ratios, and which may not exceed 3/5 of the 
fixed amount. One success measure of each lending organization is its repayment rate. The 
repayment rates at the Batumi Branch for the year of 2001, defined as the collection on 
current amounts due divided by the total current amounts due, was between 98.91% and 
99.95%. By the end of 2001 only 1.9% of all active borrowers were delinquent. 
III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
III.1 Theoretical Models 
The theoretical literature on micro-lending addresses the central problem of designing 
mechanisms in a way that borrowers have an incentive to repay their loans. This research has 
analyzed how the typical problems of a loan contract can be solved by the joint-liability 
approach as used by Constanta and other MFIs. 
Before contracting, lending organizations are confronted with the problem of attracting high 
risks. Theoretical papers (see Varian [1990], Ghatak [1999], Kritikos [1999], Van Tassel 
[1999], Armendariz and Gollier [2000], Laffont and N´Guessan [2000]) show that the 
incentives derived from the joint-liability mechanism induce similar risk types to group 
together if the borrowers have sufficient information about each other.7 The reason: any risk 
type of borrower who aims to maximize his utility will try to keep the probability of default 
within the group as low as possible. Therefore a low risk type will reject a matching with a 
high risk type. As a first result, low risk types are teamed with low risk types and high risk 
types with high risk types – an outcome which is subsequently called ‘assortative matching’. 
High risk types will face higher borrowing cost than low risk types although all groups have 
the same charges. Since they are more likely to fail, successful high risk types (being in a 
group with a failed partner) are more likely to have joint-liability payments. Consequently, 
due to more failures the additional borrowing cost in the group might become so high, that the 
expected total return is negative for high risk borrowers. It is, then, a second result of the 
mechanism that only low-risk types will apply for loans with joint-liability. The problem of 
adverse selection is reduced by a self-selection process. 
                                                 
7. Hoff and Stiglitz [1990] and Khandker [1998] provide evidence supporting the assumption that borrowers 
may generate sufficient information about each other and about the structure of the local markets.   7
Having signed the contract, moral hazard and negative repayment behavior are the main 
problems of lending money. The analysis of group contracts show that an access to higher 
loans (dynamic incentives) induces peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure among 
the borrowers when access is made dependent on the repayment of all borrowers in the group 
(cf. Stiglitz [1990], Varian [1990], Banerjee et al. [1994], Besley and Coate [1995], Hulme 
and Mosley [1996], Kritikos [1999], Armendariz and Morduch [2003]). Threatened with 
exclusion from further loans if one (or more) of its members is not able to repay (a failure 
burdening the rest of the group with additional payments), each person will monitor the other 
members so that investments are undertaken in a profitable way. Further, each person will 
support the other group members if they face repayment problems they are not responsible 
for, and each borrower will be put under pressure if he misuses his loan. As a result, the 
probability of moral hazard is reduced because, by introducing joint-liability contracts, a 
considerable part of the risk is transferred from the lender to the borrowers. 
Similar reasoning holds for the problem of strategic default when borrowers are able but 
unwilling to meet their obligations. The lender´s enforcement capacity is created through the 
termination threat (cf. Besley and Coate [1995], Armendariz [1999], Kritikos [1999]). With 
joint-liability, if a borrower rejects to repay his share of the loan, the whole credit group is 
considered as being in default loosing access to subsequent loans. This induces the group 
either to repay for the delinquent partner, or to exert social pressure on him. As a consequence 
of these incentives, lenders are able to achieve the repayment of all loans with high 
probability, if the prerequisites a)-d) mentioned in section 1 are met. 
The main problem of the joint-liability mechanism arises from the termination threat. If a 
group, not able to repay the loan of one defaulting member, is excluded from further loans, 
we may observe a domino effect. In this case, the group members’ best strategy is not to 
repay their loans either because all members will be excluded irrespective of their individual 
ability to repay their own loan (cf. Besley and Coate [1995], Paxton [1996], Kritikos [1999], 
Rai and Sjöström [2004]). This outcome is disadvantageous for the MFI because all other 
group members except the defaulter could have repaid their loans. 
From a theoretical point of view, the probability of group defection can be reduced if the 
contract is designed in a way that it pays only for low-risk borrowers to apply for a joint-
liability loan (as shown earlier in this subsection). In these groups, the probability is low that 
more than one borrower will be unable to repay, provided that the business correlation of the 
borrowers is not too high (cf. Kritikos [1999]). In the case of one defaulter the MFI can be 
almost sure that the rest of the group will be able to cover his installments.8 
                                                 
8. Field experience shows that MFIs focus on this problem. Loan officers evaluate the ability of a group to cover 
a defecting member’s installment. Repayment schedules are designed in a way that each borrower, assuming his 
business develops as planned, is able to cover his own rates and (partly) those of his peers.   8
III.2 The Research Agenda 
The empirical literature has only partly examined to what extent the incentive components are 
effective in improving loan repayment. In particular, we examine to what extent all kind of 
group processes as self-selection and peer measures are observed in reality and influence the 
repayment behavior. With respect to the group selection process before loan contracts are 
signed, there are the following issues at stake: First, to what extent is the group, if self-
selected, homogeneous with respect to risk-taking behavior and with respect to other 
characteristics? Secondly, do social ties between the members of a group have any impact on 
their behavior? Third, do only low-risk borrowers team up to groups? 
After the loan disbursement, we address the following questions. Is the set of incentives 
sufficient to make the loan repayment an individually rational choice where no peer 
components need to be activated, or is it foremost the group mechanism which induces peer 
monitoring, peer pressure and peer support, then leading to high repayment rates. If the group 
is active, what are the intentions of the group members when they exert their peer measures. 
To what extent are further factors beyond the joint-liability mechanism, such as dynamic 
incentives or other collateral substitutes, necessary to maintain high repayment rates? If 
repayment problems arise, the impact of loan officers needs to be analyzed in this context. Do 
they exert outside pressure on defaulting members of a group? 
III.3 Earlier Empirical Evidence 
Some questions have been addressed. Wydick [1999] who uses data of ACCION in 
Guatemala, focused his empirical investigations on the impact of different kind of social 
cohesion on borrowing group performance: social ties, peer monitoring, and peer pressure. 
Strong social ties proved to have a rather negative effect on group behavior – a result which 
received further support from the study of van Bastelaer and Leathers [2002] in Zambia and 
Ahlin and Townsend in Thailand [2003]. Improvement of the repayment performance was 
associated mostly with variables used as proxies for peer monitoring and peer pressure. 
However, Mondal and Tune [1993] emphasize that too weak social ties may also lead to 
negative outcomes, if there is no willingness to support the fellow group members. 
The findings of Zeller [1998] are different, showing that in Madagascar groups with a higher 
level of social cohesion had a significantly higher repayment rate. Wenner [1995] used the 
data from 25 Costa Rican FINCA credit groups to study the validity and cost-effectiveness of 
group lending as a means to transmit informations about borrowers. He found that members 
of groups engaged in formal screening with an internal code of regulations had a low 
probability for delinquency, indicating that screening indeed resulted in an informational 
efficiency gain, a result which is supported by Zeller [1998].   9
Paxton [1996] investigated the group dynamics of the MFI “Le Project de Promotion du Petit 
Credit Rural” in Burkina Faso. The results indicated that urban, homogeneous groups with 
sufficient training and reliable leaders had the highest probability of repaying their loans. 
Moreover, a domino effect was observed, thus influencing the loan default rate. Paxton [1996] 
also found another obstacle, namely a long-term mismatching problem, not discussed in 
theory. It states that groups tend to experience repayment difficulties after several loan cycles 
which they could not foresee during the process of building the group. As loan sizes increase 
due to the dynamic incentives, preferred loan terms and volumes will differ with the 
consequence that borrowers with smaller loan volumes will reject joint-liability for borrowers 
with higher loan volumes in the same group if the latter run into repayment difficulties. 
Paxton [1996] showed that the probability of loan repayment may decrease if a group runs 
into the mismatching problem. Similarly, Godquin [2002] discovered, as well, that the 
borrowers’ repayment performance deteriorated with the age of the group. 
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE MICRO-FINANCE MECHANISM OF CONSTANTA 
In this section we present the sampling design, the data and the results of our survey which 
allows us to test the effectivity of all components of a micro-lending contract. By using a 
questionnaire, we surveyed 108 randomly selected groups of the Batumi branch of Constanta9 
(24% of all groups). To exclude correlated answers, one randomly selected member of each 
group was questioned and his answers were considered representative for the whole group. 
The questionnaire focuses on the process of group formation, loan repayment and income 
performance, and on activities between group members after the loan disbursement. All 
questions were close-ended, enabling the borrowers to give precise and unambiguous 
responses. When necessary, additional explanations were given by the interviewers. No 
serious problems with missing values occurred. To assess the trustfulness of the interviewee’s 
responses we asked the clients whether they would be able to borrow from other official 
credit institutions in the region. 97 interviewees answered truthfully (those without collateral, 
89% of the borrowers, would not have access) and were included into the sample. 
To study the dynamics of the group-lending mechanism, we define several hypotheses which 
are related to the theoretical results shown in section 3.1. Then we designed an econometric 
model which replicates the two-stage nature of the principal-agent relation: the mutual 
screening process before signing the loan contract, and the mutual monitoring and 
enforcement process after the credit disbursement. The aim of the model is on the one hand to 
test in what way the theoretical predictions are correct and on the other hand to discover novel 
empirical relationships beyond existing theories. 
                                                 
9. Batumi is the capital city in the region named Adjaria, an area which shows no economical or cultural 
differences in comparison to the other parts of Georgia. The lending technology used in the local branch of 
Constanta does not differ from the technology applied in the other regions of the country.    10
IV.1 Assortative matching 
IV.1.1 Hypothesis 
Starting with the analysis of group formation, we aim to identify what variables influence the 
process of self-selection. Theoretically, the key factor of group lending is that types with 
similar repayment risks will group together. We test the theoretical outcome by the following 
Hypothesis 1: The lower the interviewed borrower’s probability for a loan default is, the 
lower is the risk of the business projects of all peers in his group. 
We apply an econometric model, which is constructed so that it captures the most important 
factors contributing to the self-selection process (equation 1). An ordered logit model was 
specified to obtain the coefficient estimates.  
Group quality (GQ) = f (borrower’s risk type (RT), information (I), education (E), credit 
needs (CN), relationship (R), monitoring (M), peer control (PC), peer pressure (PP)) 




























                                                                                                                                           (1) 
 where j = 1, 2, …, J indicates the ordered categories in the dependent variable.                           
The dependent variable, group quality, indicates how the borrower evaluated the risk of the 
business projects of his peers at the time the group was formed (a scale ranging from 1- “all 
businesses were quite risky” to 5- “all businesses were quite safe”). It is an aggregate 
assessment of the group members’ risk characteristics, excluding the interviewed borrower. 
The interdependence between group quality and the independent variable, borrower’s risk 
type, enables the testing of hypothesis 1. In contrast to group quality, which shows the risk 
characteristics of the group, borrower’s risk type reflects the risk profile of the interviewed 
borrower. It is computed as a cluster analysis score using the following three indicators: 1) 
borrower’s average monthly business income measured as an interval that ranges from 1- “up 
to 100 GEL” to 5- “more than 400 GEL”, 2) development of the monthly income after the 
disbursement of the first loan (1- “decreased substantially” to 5- “increased significantly”), 
and 3) borrower’s own assessment of the stability of his business project (1- “quite unstable” 
to 5- “very stable”). Three clusters were specified: “low risk” (24% of the interviewed 
borrowers), “intermediate risk” (44%), and “higher risk” (32%) (see Table 1). 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
The second independent variable, information, indicates how well the borrower knew the 
business projects of his peers at the time the self-selection took place (from 1- “no   11
information at all” to 5- “detailed information about all projects”). It is often assumed (cf. 
Stiglitz [1990]) that group members have perfect information about each other. 
Variables  education, credit needs, and relationship show whether certain personal 
characteristics help the applicants to enter a certain group. Education (a dichotomous variable 
taking a value of 1 if the respondent has a university degree and 0 otherwise) stands for higher 
knowledge and better learning skills. The parameter coefficient should be positive if the 
assumption holds that higher educated people become better entrepreneurs. Credit needs 
indicates how much money the interviewed client would have borrowed from Constanta 
assuming that there were no constraints on the loan size. It is an interval ranging from 1-“up 
to 500 GEL” to 5- “more than 2.000 GEL”. Relationship (a nominal variable with a value of 1 
if the borrower has relatives among the group members, 2- if the borrower has close friends 
among the group members, and 3- if the group members are just partners) shows whether 
kinship or friendship provides any advantages to the applicants in the selection process. 
The other exogenous variables test whether the groups of lower risk have internal rules that 
are stricter than the rules followed by the borrowers from higher risk groups. Monitoring 
indicates the frequency of meetings between group members (from 1- “once a month” to 5- 
“every day”). Peer control shows how often the borrowers discuss their business problems 
within the groups (1- “never” to 5- “on a regular basis”). Peer pressure measures the group 
members’ willingness to sanction delinquent partners. It is a latent variable extracted by a 
factor analysis using the following three highly correlated variables: (1) pressure the group 
exerts or would exert on a delinquent member (answers rating from 1- “no pressure” to 5- 
“extremely strong pressure”), (2) sanctions the group imposes or would impose on a 
delinquent member (from 1- “no sanctions” to 5- “immediate exclusion from the group”) and 
(3) sanctions the MFI imposes or would impose on a defaulting group (from 1- “the group 
receives further loans but their size does not increase with time” to 5- “all group members are 
immediately excluded from the lending program”). 
IV.1.2 Empirical Results 
We evaluate the efficiency of the self-selection process by applying the specified econometric 
model to the empirical data. Descriptions and descriptive statistics on all key variables are 
presented in Table 2. Note that the dependant variable, group quality, has only three 
categories, even though by definition it could take five values, from 1- “all businesses quite 
risky” to 5- “all businesses quite safe”. In our survey none of the borrowers chose answers (1) 
or (2) - indicating high risk businesses.10 
                                                 
10. At first glance, this outcome raises the question of biased answers. However, there are good reasons to reject 
such conjecture. Firstly, the variable group quality is not a self-report of the risk-characteristics of the 
interviewed borrower, but an aggregate evaluation of the other group members. Secondly, the mere fact that   12
- insert Tables 2 and 3 about here - 
The empirical results are listed in Table 3. Risk type and information significantly influence 
the  group quality. Figure 1 illustrates the first part of this finding by showing that the 
borrowers with lower risk characteristics have chosen partners with more reliable business 
projects. The significance of the second variable, I, makes clear that borrowers a priori do not 
dispose all necessary information about their perspective peers as assumed in theory.11 The 
other independent variables are statistically insignificant, showing that personal 
characteristics do not substantially influence the process of self-selection. 
Figure 1: Borrowers’ Self-Selection 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Number of borrowers (in %) who evaluated the business project 





quite safe safe not very safe
 
Result 1: The group formation is influenced by the two variables Borrower’s risk type and 
Information. In favor of hypothesis 1, we found that lower risk borrowers, by making use of 
the local information which is also generated during the selection process and which is only 
available to them, indeed team up with lower risk borrowers and vice versa. 
Result 1 is also fundamental to the further analysis. For that we may return to the business 
risk of the ‘other’ borrowers in each group as it is assessed by the interviewed borrower. As 
emphasized in section 3.1, theory makes two propositions with respect to assortative 
matching if the group-lending contract is properly designed. The first proposition that an 
applicant who beliefs that his perspective peers run unprofitable businesses would not join the 
group, is supported by Result 1. The second proposition that only low risk borrowers should 
be attracted to peer group loans is supported by the fact that no borrower evaluated his peers’ 
projects as high risk businesses. Thus, due to the borrowers’ self-selection process and due to 
the fact that almost no default occurred, we may conclude that no high risk businesses were 
able to build a stable group and to receive a group loan.  
                                                                                                                                                          
there were almost no defaulting borrowers corresponds to the interviewee’s assessment that his peers are not 
running any high-risk businesses. We return to this conjecture when discussing result 1. 
11. This supports the critical discussion of Jain and Moore [2003] about the information status of borrowers.   13
IV.2 Testing the efficiency of the applied incentive mechanisms 
IV.2.1 Hypothesis 
When loans are disbursed, it is hypothesized that the mechanism gives borrowers either a 
direct incentive or, via the induced behavior of peer monitoring, peer pressure, and peer 
support an indirect incentive to both choose investments of low risk and refrain from strategic 
default, mitigating the problems of moral hazard and contract enforcement: 
Hypothesis 2: The repayment rate will significantly improve if peers (1) monitor each other 
more intensively; (2) impose stronger social sanctions; (3) show more willingness to provide 
peer support; and (4) appreciate the opportunity to have access to subsequent loans and (5) to 
higher loan volumes. 
We take into consideration the dynamics of the group-lending mechanism. Borrowers may 
choose between different strategies. If all group members decide for the same move, 
contribute their shares or defect, the outcome is straightforward. The group repays or defaults. 
If the group members choose different moves, they have to go through the second stage of 
their repayment decision. Those borrowers ready to contribute their shares, need to compare 
the discounted benefits of having access to further loans with the cost of repaying the 
outstanding loan(s). They have to decide whether to force the delinquent partner(s) to repay, 
or alternatively, to make up for the difference and to exclude the defaulters. 
To capture all aspects of the decision making, two equations are introduced. At the first stage, 
to be called ‘internal repayment performance’, the members of the groups decide about their 
repayment without being delinquent. At the second stage, to be called ‘external repayment 
performance’, behavior is observed when the repayment was due and when loan officers may 
put the group under pressure. Equation (2) (see also Table 4 in the Appendix) reflects the 
dynamics of the first stage of the repayment decision and shows all major factors that affect 
the internal repayment performance between the members of the credit group. The dependent 
variable is dichotomous with a value of 1 if there were no cases of internal delinquency in the 
group and 0 otherwise. A binary logit model is specified.  
Internal delinquency (ID) = f (borrower’s risk type (RT), peer control (PC), peer pressure 
(PP), peer support (PS), dynamic incentives (DI), staff pressure (SP), business correlation 
(CORR), social ties (ST)) 
()
()
ST CORR SP RT DI PS PP PC
ID P
ID P
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1
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    (2) 
Equation (3) (see also Table 5 in the Appendix) replicates the second stage of the repayment 
decision. We aim to find the characteristics distinguishing between groups with external 
repayment problems from groups with perfect repayment history or groups which experienced   14
internal repayment problems but solved them without violating the repayment schedule. We 
use a multi-nominal logit model where the dependent variable can take three values: 1 if there 
were no repayment problems in the group, 2 if the group had internal repayment problems but 
solved them, and 3 if there were cases of external delinquency in the group.  
Delinquency status (DS) = f (group quality (GQ), peer control (PC), peer pressure (PP), peer 
support (PS), dynamic incentives (DI), staff pressure (SP), business correlation (CORR), 
social ties (ST)) 
()
()
ST CORR SP GQ DI PS PP PC
DS P
j DS P j j j j j j j j j
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 3








  (3) 
where j = 1, 2 refers to the delinquency status of the borrowing groups as described above, 
and () ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 1 3 = − = − = = DS P DS P DS P .                           
To verify the validity of hypothesis 2 we perform tests for parameter significance of the 
variables peer control, peer pressure, peer support and dynamic incentives. A description of 
the first two variables is provided in section 4.1.1. Peer support shows the willingness for 
mutual help among group members. It is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 if ceteris 
paribus borrowers prefer group to individual lending and 0 otherwise. Dynamic incentives is a 
factor analysis score measuring to what extent the borrower values the access to subsequent 
loans that are (1) of a bigger size, (2) at lower interest rate, (3) with longer terms to maturity, 
and (4) at lower transaction costs. 
The RHS of both equations contains four more variables, which may influence repayment 
behavior. The borrower’s risk type in equation (2) and group quality in equation (3) are 
expected to be correlated where the internal repayment performance is affected by the 
individuals’ risk and the external repayment behavior depends on the characteristics of the 
complete group. Business correlation shows to what extent the returns of borrowers are 
linked to each other, because of mutual trading activities, common clientele, common 
suppliers, etc. The degree of interdependence is measured on an ascending scale from 1- “no 
correlation among members’ businesses” to 5- “extremely strong correlation”. The variable 
indicates whether risk diversification matters.12 Social ties reflects the degree of homogeneity 
among the group members with respect to social characteristics.13 The last variable, staff 
pressure, shows how often the loan officers pay a visit to the group members (1- “less than 
                                                 
12. For a discussion about the relevance of risk diversification, cf. Krahnen and Schmidt [1994]. A different 
argument is raised by Armendariz de Aghion [1999] who asserts that a high business correlation would 
guarantee better (if not excessive) monitoring, which reduces the probability of strategic default. This argument 
is in contrast to Krahnen and Schmidt [1994] insofar as they expect a lower repayment probability for a high 
business correlation, while Armendariz de Aghion [1999] expects a higher repayment probability. 
13. Common characteristics shared by the group members are gender, age, education, income, and place of 
living.   15
once a month” to 5- “several times a week”). It is a proxy of the loan officers’ monitoring 
efforts. 
IV.2.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical results from the specified binary and multinominal logit models are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5. The coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates. The parameter 
significance is evaluated by the Wald statistics. 
IV.2.2.1 Internal Repayment Performance 
In our sample 24 % of the groups experienced repayment problems. Table 4 shows that there 
are two variables which significantly influence the internal repayment performance: peer 
support and peer pressure. Internal solutions to the repayment problems were then realized 
when the borrowers were willing to support or control their delinquent peers. 
- insert Table 4 about here - 
Starting with peer support which takes a value of 1 if borrowers prefer group to individual 
lending we found that the group contract was preferred by 30% of the groups. In these groups, 
by supporting the delinquent partner, all problems of delinquency were solved, even without 
informing the staff. In groups whose members prefer individual lending, in only 60% of the 
cases with internal repayment problems the group managed to repay the entire debt on time. 
Most of them did it by imposing sanctions on the defaulting member and eventually forcing 
him to repay, whereas only a minority solved the problem by making up the difference. 
In this context it has to be mentioned that the main reason of borrowers to prefer the group to 
the individual lending scheme, is their confidence in the group’s willingness to provide 
mutual help either by temporarily covering repayment obligations or by offering labor support 
which usually prevents the occurrence of repayment problems. Vice versa, the absence of 
peer support in a group implies that each borrower has to manage his problems independently, 
thus increasing the probability of failure. We conclude with: 
Result 2: Groups with a preference for group loans show more willingness for peer support 
so that the probability that a group member ends up with a repayment problem is smaller than 
for groups where the borrowers preferred an individual lending scheme. 
We also analyze whether the willingness to provide peer support changes over time when, 
according to Paxton [1996], more and more problems are expected to occur (due to a potential 
mismatching). We measured the sensitivity of group support to the loan cycle by separately 
applying the econometric model to two sub-samples of borrowers, the first one with three or 
less loans and the second one with more than three loans. Peer support is statistically   16
significant only in the second sub-sample. We may conclude that group support grows 
stronger in the course of time (which is also in line with recent findings of Murgai et al. 
[2001]). This finding gives evidence to the viability of group lending and its ability to 
generate high repayment rates over a relatively long period of time. The results presented here 
are different to those of Paxton’s [1996] investigation with respect to the mismatching 
problem. We will return to this contradicting evidence in the next section. 
Peer control is the second significant variable. Its coefficient surprisingly exhibits a negative 
sign. To interpret this result, we assert that for most of Constanta’s borrowers, the exchange 
of business information is more a corrective measure than a preventive one. 
Result 3: The more repayment difficulties arise in a group, the more intensive the intra-group 
exchange. At the MFI Constanta, the real state of the investments is verified if one group 
member declares inability to repay. Peer control, then, accounts for the borrowers auditing 
effort, where the business conditions of the delinquent peers are analyzed. 
IV.2.2.2 External Repayment Performance 
Internal delinquency is an intra-group problem and does not affect the lender. The MFI is 
usually not aware of all cases of internal delinquency because borrowers may solve their 
problems within the group. By employing equation (3), we analyze the impact of joint-
liability contracts on groups which were not able to pay the weekly installments on time. 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the applied multinominal logit model. Column (1) reveals 
the variables differentiating between ‘perfect payers’ and ‘defaulters’, whereas Column (2) 
compares ‚defaulters’ with groups whose members solved their repayment problems by their 
own. From the statistical properties of the variables group quality, peer pressure, and staff 
pressure we may conclude that the members of the groups, which are most likely to promptly 
fulfill their repayment obligations, run safer businesses, exert stronger pressure on delinquent 
partners, and communicate more often with the loan officers. The negative coefficient of 
business correlation points to a problem which several MFIs face, namely the vulnerability to 
external shocks of groups where the returns proved to be positively correlated. 
- insert Table 5 about here - 
Starting with the variable peer pressure, it shows to be significant in both cases, indicating 
that the probability of default is considerably smaller for groups whose members impose or 
threatened to impose social sanctions.  
Result 4: Peer pressure significantly improves the external repayment but does not influence 
the internal repayment performance indicating that most borrowers of Constanta exert peer 
pressure only if a repayment problem has occurred. The result is confirmed by the negative 
sign of the peer control variable in Column (1).   17
A further crucial factor is the self-selection process. While the borrower’s risk type showed to 
be not significant for the improvement of the internal repayment performance (Table 4), the 
significance of the group quality variable (Table 5) indicates that groups consisting of higher-
risk borrowers are more likely to be delinquent than groups formed by low-risk clients. 
Repayment difficulties made it then necessary that peers and loan officers exert pressure upon 
the delinquent borrowers to make them repay their overdue rates. 
Result 5: Even though higher-risk borrowers did not default more often than low-risk clients, 
in case of delinquency higher risk borrowers were less able to employ support measures for 
solving repayment problems internally before a rate is due. Instead peer pressure was mostly 
necessary to ensure a delayed repayment of the loan rates. 
Column (2) reveals further support with respect to this finding. Focusing on the role of the 
loan officers and their influence on the group dynamics, we observe that most of the groups 
who experienced internal repayment problems but successfully solved them had been more 
intensively monitored by the loan officers. 
Result 6: Staff pressure, being significant, shows that the control exercised by the MFI over 
the problematic groups improves the cooperation among the members. 
A further interesting finding can be derived from a comparison of the statistical characteristics 
of the variables group quality and social ties. Group quality specifies the members’ business 
characteristics whereas social ties measures the homogeneity of the group in terms to several 
demographic and social factors. The significance of the former and the insignificance of the 
latter indicate that the lender’s repayment performance can be improved only if clients build 
groups of similar investment risks. Other group characteristics have no impact. These results 
are similar to the findings of Wydick (1999) where social ties proved to have no (or a 
negative) effect on borrowing group behavior. 
The variable business correlation measures the degree of interdependence across members’ 
businesses. With respect to this variable one has to take the negative consequences of bad risk 
diversification into account as well as the potentially positive consequences if the borrowers 
monitor each other in a better way (see Footnote 12). In Constanta the variable negatively 
affects the expected return of the lender: 
Result 7: (1) An increase in the (scale of) business correlation significantly raises the 
probability that all group members will suffer the same negative shock, then leading to more 
delinquencies. (2) Regressing the business correlation variable on monitoring shows the 
coefficient to be insignificant (with a p-value of 0.698). 
IV.2.2.3 Testing the Influence of Further Variables   18
In the final subsection, we analyze two further variables often discussed in the context of 
group loans, namely the insignificance of dynamic incentives and gender aspects.  
Result 8: The variable dynamic incentives does neither affect the internal nor the external 
repayment performance of the borrowers of Constanta. 
An explanation for this surprising result is that Constanta’s clients, having small, and only 
occasionally developing businesses, were not in need of a stream of increasingly larger loans. 
To test for reliability we checked whether there is any correlation between the dynamics of a 
borrower’s business and his demand for increasing loans. A Spearman’s non-parametric test 
(Table 6) shows that the two variables are positively correlated (at .05 significance level). The 
more dynamic the development of the business project the higher the borrower values the 
opportunity to obtain larger loans. After the first loan cycles, however, many of Constanta’s 
clients refuse to increase the borrowed amount, showing that access to subsequent loans is an 
issue, while increasing loan size is not.14 
- insert Table 6 about here - 
Some credit programs like the Grameen Bank explicitly target women, which suggests that 
women are better borrowers then men because they have a better developed sense of group 
solidarity (cf. Bernasek and Stanfield [1997]). Others (cf. e.g. Rahman [1998] or Kritikos and 
Bolle [2000]) argue that there are differing reasons (although highly correlated with gender 
aspects) for the better repayment behaviour of this target group, such as fewer borrowing 
possibilities or greater responsibility towards the family. In 1997, Constanta offered loans 
only to women, but successfully expanded its activities to male borrowers. The empirical data 
show that women do not outperform men. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this study is to investigate the complete dynamics of joint-liability micro-lending 
technologies. The results enable us to explain three puzzles of micro-finance. The first puzzle 
focuses on the impact of joint-liability contracts on the behavior of borrowers. Starting with 
the hypothesis of assortative matching, the empirical results support the theoretical 
proposition that low risk borrowers indeed team up with low risk borrowers. Since virtually 
all borrowing groups repaid their loans, it seems that the MFI Constanta was also successful 
in meeting the second hypothesis of assortative matching: Potential borrowers with high risk 
characteristics did not apply for this kind of loan contract confirming the hypothesis that the 
mechanism supports efficient self-selection. 
                                                 
14. Since the next loan actually disbursed depends on the business needs and reported cash flow of each 
borrower the observed average increase is only 15 to 30%.   19
Focusing on the clients’ behavior after the contract signature, there exist sufficient individual 
incentives for each group member to repay his loan as long as his business develops well. 
Strategic defaults were not a serious problem. Moreover, there was no incidence of excessive 
monitoring: borrowers had not experienced pressure from their peers to invest only in certain 
projects. Whenever repayment problems were created (e.g. by external influences), the 
incentive system did, in fact, cause mutual activities. At the MFI Constanta, peer support 
grows stronger over time, in particular when the group members prefer joint-liability to other 
schemes. Peer pressure and controlling are used by borrowers mainly as corrective measures 
and help the MFI solve the enforcement problem. 
As the variables external repayment performance and business correlation showed, a cost-
effective MFI should also restrict its offers to borrowers where the expected marginal 
enforcement cost is covered by the expected marginal revenue of the group and it needs to 
take care for the business correlation of the group members before the group formation. 
Let us turn to the second puzzle. In theoretical papers, it is emphasized that the joint-liability 
contract leads to an efficient self-selection and to peer measures so that almost all problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection are solved by the borrowers themselves. The screening, 
monitoring and enforcement efforts of lenders are not explicitly considered. At the same time 
several micro-lending practitioners claim that high repayment rates occur only because of the 
activities of loan officers (cf. e.g. Jain [1995]). As emphasized in section 2, each lending 
organization indeed spends money, time and effort in the process of group building, after the 
loan disbursement and, in particular, in case of delinquency. 
The empirical results of the present paper support the existence of both, activities between the 
borrowers and by the loan officers. It allows for the conclusion that the activities of the loan 
officers have a rather complementary effect on the efficacy of the mechanism. The screening 
process is complementary in the sense that, while there is deliberate grouping, loan officers 
take restrictive measures towards the freshly created borrower group. The loan repayment 
performance will be better, if the loan officers ensure that the prerequisites mentioned in 
section I are met, that the loan sizes are not too high in relation to the expected cash flow of 
the borrowers, and that the businesses are not correlated.15 
In this context, it has to be emphasized that it is important for another reason that the loan 
officers threaten to use the known sanctions of the joint-liability approach on the first day a 
group is in arrears. The probability that a delinquent borrower will be able to “save” his 
business from insolvency is higher the earlier the appropriate measures are taken for a 
positive turn-around of the business (see e.g. Evers et al. [2000]). In short, the loan officers, 
                                                 
15. Screening activities were not included as an explanatory factor in the model due to the highly standardized 
screening procedure. They are fixed and do not substantially vary among the current clients.   20
by making immediate use of the “letter of the law”, induce borrowers to better solve their 
repayment problems. Thus, our answer to the second puzzle is: The mechanism performs as 
described in theory, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties. 
The third puzzle focuses on the result that the variable dynamic incentives proved to have no 
impact on the repayment performance at Constanta. This puzzle can be solved if a further 
factor is analyzed, namely the long term development of borrowers in a group. We suggest 
that there are two typical forms of long-term development of borrower groups. According to 
recent research (Lazear [2003] and Kritikos and Wießner [2004]), we may differentiate 
between entrepreneurs who are characterized by their skills and abilities in the decision 
process of developing a business project. Depending on their skills, there might be 
entrepreneurs who are able to realize a business of increasing size (to be classified as dynamic 
business), and there might be entrepreneurs who are runing – due to their lower skills - a 
business with less or no dynamic perspective (to be classified as static business). 
Entrepreneurs who formed groups of dynamic investments respond positively to dynamic 
incentives. However, after some loan periods, due to the more dynamic investments they have 
a higher probability of running into a long term mismatching problem. This mismatching 
problem may lead to differing outcomes. Some of the businesses in a group might be able to 
gain high profits while others may suffer losses. Then, a domino effect may be unleashed, 
according to which the defaulters in the group (who generate losses) may encourage those 
borrowers (who generate profits) to decide for default, as well. The probability that such a 
group will run into repayment problems will increase over time. 
The second investment type concerns a group making investments with low development 
prospects. Such groups need access to further loans (and feel sanctioned from the threat of 
exclusion), but do only initially – during the first loan periods - respond to dynamic 
incentives. Over the course of loan periods, due to their relatively static investments, they 
have no mismatching problems because the probability of having one group member with 
high profits and another one with no profits is low. If these borrowers deliberately chose this 
kind of contract, they will be willing to provide peer support. The probability that a complete 
group such as this will run into a repayment problem decreases over time. 
It is in the interest of MFIs to minimize the probability of a domino effect. The variable 
‘dynamic incentives’ in group-lending methodologies should be restricted. Long-term 
prospects within group loans should only be given to investments with low development 
perspectives. Borrowers with dynamic investments who make use of group loans in the 
beginning will then switch to individual credit offers if they are in need of higher loans. Since 
such a restriction is in sharp contrast to the aim of many MFIs to become financially self 
sufficient (cf. Schreiner [2002] and Woller [2002]), MFIs which restrict the size of their 
group loan, should also start to offer individual loans for those clients who are in need of   21
higher loans and who will make a higher contribution to the profitability of an MFI. 
Combined offers like this will also be a proper answer to the commercialisation of 
microlending which has taken place in recent years (cf. e.g. Christen and Drake [2002]).   22
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 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Variables  Mean Std.  Dev. 
Group Quality  Categorical Variable (1- “low group quality”, 2- “intermediate group quality”, 3- “high group quality”)  4.16 .49 
Internal Delinquency  Dichotomous variable (1- “no incidence of internal delinquency in the group”, 0 otherwise)  .77 .423 
Delinquency Status  Categorical variable (1- “no repayment problems in the group”, 2- “internal repayment problem in the group”, 3- 
“external delinquency in the group”) 
.31 .621 
Borrower’s Risk Type  Categorical variable (1- „low risk borrowers”, 2- “intermediate risk borrowers”, 3- “higher risk borrowers”)  2.05 .755 
Information  Scale (1- “no information about other group members’ business projects” to 5- “detailed information about the other 
group members’ business projects”) 
4.36 .898 
Education  Dichotomous variable (1- “university”,  0 – “secondary school or college”)  .23 .424 
Credit needs  Scale (1- “less than 500 GEL” to 5- “more than 2000 GEL”)  2.24 1.03 
Relationship  Categorical variable (1- “relatives among group members”, 2- “close friends among group members”, 3- “the group 
members are just partners”) 
2.27 .792 
Monitoring  Scale (1 “group members meet once a month” to 5 “group members meet every day”)  4.65 .  94 
Peer Control  Scale (1- “members never discuss business problems within the group” to 5- “members regularly discuss business 
problems within the group”) 
2.30 1.34 
Peer Pressure  Factor Analysis Score indicating the pressure exerted by the group on delinquent members  -5.6E-17 .  830 
Business Correlation  Scale (1- “no correlation across group members’ project returns” to 5- “extremely strong correlation about other group 
members’ business projects”) 
3.48 1.2 
Staff Pressure  Scale (1- “the loan officer pays a visit to the group less than once a month” to 5- “the loan officer pays a visit to the 
group several times a week”) 
3.39 1.39 
Peer Support  Dichotomous variable (1- “preferences to a joint-liability loan contract”, 0- “preferences to an individual loan 
contract”) 
.28 .453 
Social Ties  Scale indicating the number of common characteristics shared by the group members: gender, age, education, income, 
and place of living. 
2.63 1.18 
Dynamic Incentives  Factor Analysis Score indicating to what extent the borrower values the access to subsequent loans that are of a bigger 
size, at lower interest rate, with longer terms to maturity, and at lower transaction costs. 
.000 .926 
 TABLE 3. SELECTION PROCESS: ORDERED LOGIT MODEL 
Number of obs  =       84   
Test of parallel lines
a:     Wald  chi2(11)    =  29.262 
Chi2 (10)     = 10.429      Prob > chi2   =   0.001 
Prob > chi2  =    .404      Nagelkerker R2 =   0.399 
  Coefficient Std. Error  df  Wald
 
Risk Type (1)  1.972**   (0.933)  1  4.469 
Risk Type (2)  1.486*   (0.845)  1  3.093 
Information 1.268**    (0.498)  1  6.484 
Education (1)  -1.104   (0.785)  1  1.976 
Credit Needs  0.23   (0.222)  1  1.07 
Relationship (Relatives)  0.257   (0.777)  1  0.109 
Relationship (Friends)  -0.632   (0.701)  1  0.814 
Monitoring 0.506    (0.436)  1  1.343 
Peer Control  -0.337   (0.23)  1  2.149 
Peer Pressure  -0.042   (0.372)  1  0.013 
Intercept 1  3.254   (2.791)  1  1.359 
Intercept 2  10.051***   (3.356)  1  8.97 
**Significance at the 5% level; *Significance at the 10% level 
  
(a) The null hypothesis states that the slope coefficients are the same 
across response categories. The high p-value (.404) implies that the null 
hypothesis of identical slope coefficients across response categories 
cannot be rejected. 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of the ordered logit model used to 
test hypothesis 1 (equation (1)). The coefficients (column 2) are 
maximum likelihood estimates. The statistical significance of the 
individual coefficients is evaluated by the Wald test. 
 
 TABLE  4.  BINARY  LOGIT  MODEL OF GROUP  INTERNAL  REPAYMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
      Wald  chi2(11)    =  22.894 
Groups with internal delinquency = 21    Prob > chi2   =   0.006 
Groups without repayment problems = 66  Nagelkerker R2 =   0.346 
Internal Delinquency  Coefficient Std. Error  Wald  Exp (B)
 
Peer Support   2.035**   (0.923)  4.860  7.652 
Dynamic Incentives   -0.137   (0.365)  0.141  0.872 
Risk Type (1)      1.540   
Risk Type (2)  -0.691   (0.803)  0.742  0.501 
Risk Type (3)  0.198   (0.731)  0.073  1.218 
Peer Pressure  0.393   (0.378)  1.080  1.481 
Peer Control  -0.768***   (0.243)  10.024 0.464 
Staff Pressure  -0.373   (0.238)  2.465  0.689 
Business Correlation  0.002   (0.269)  0.000  1.002 
Social Ties  -0.101   (0.285)  0.126  0.904 
Intercept 4.386***    (1.639)  7.159  80.294 
                 ***Significance at the 1% level; **Significance at the 5% level 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of a binary logit model of group internal 
repayment performance (equation 2). The coefficients (column 2) are 
maximum likelihood estimates. The statistical significance of the individual 
coefficients is evaluated by the Wald test. Column 5 lists the odd ratios (Exp 
B). TABLE  5.  MULTINOMINAL  LOGIT  MODEL OF GROUP  EXTERNAL 
REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE 
       Wald  chi2(11)    =  26.220 
       Prob  >  chi2    =      0.024 
Number of obs  =  84          Pseudo R2  =   0.085 
 
(1) 
No delinquency vs. 
External Delinquency 
(2) 
Internal Delinquency only 
vs. External Delinquency 
  Coefficient  Wald   Coefficient  Wald  
Peer Support  2.920   (2.198)  1.014   (0.202) 
Dynamic Incentives  -0.725   (0.644)  -1.046   (1.087) 
Group Quality  3.697**   (4.749)  3.319*   (3.180) 
Peer Pressure  1.746*   (3.439)  2.106**   (4.258) 
Peer Control  -1.480*   (3.770)  -0.906   (1.286) 
Staff Pressure  0.272   (0.480)  1.129**   (4.803) 
Business Correlation  -1.550*   (3.117)  -2.090**   (5.044) 
Social Ties  -0.402   (0.350)  -0.511   (0.442) 
Intercept   -2.012   (0.118)  -4.452   (0.426) 
** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Notes: The table presents the parameter estimates of the separate logistic regressions 
of the multinominal logit model used for testing hypothesis 2 (equation 3). We 
compare, in succession, 1) groups, which never experienced repayment problems 
with defaulting groups, and 2) groups which experienced internal repayment 
problems but managed to solve them independently with groups that failed to. The 
statistical significance of the individual coefficients is evaluated by the Wald test.  
 
 
TABLE  6:  SPEARMAN’ RHO NON-PARAMETRIC TEST FOR CORRELATION 




Changes in the borrower’s 












** Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
 




This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using 
our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as 
joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. 
As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk 
borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, 
peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution 
to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that 
the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100%, if the loan officers fulfill their 
complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear 
that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term 
problems of the joint-liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino 
effect, are to be tackled notably. 
 
Dieses Papier analysiert auf Basis eigener Daten die Wirksamkeit sogenannter 
Mikrokredit-Verträge. Insbesondere wird untersucht, in welcher Weise Instrumente wie 
die Gruppenhaftung oder der Zugang zu weiteren, dann höheren Krediten das 
Rückzahlungsverhalten von Kreditnehmern beeinflußt, wenn diese keine Sicherheiten 
stellen können. Die empirische Analyse weist die Bildung homogener Gruppen von 
Kreditnehmern in Bezug auf deren Ausfallrisiko nach. Erfüllen die Kreditsachbearbeiter 
ihre komplementären Aufgaben, so führen die Instrumente nach Kreditvergabe zu ‚Peer 
Support‘ und ‚Peer Pressure‘, sobald einzelne Kreditnehmer in einer Kreditgruppe 
Zahlungsschwierigkeiten haben. Insgesamt läßt sich zeigen, daß die Anreizmechanismen 
in ihrer Kombination Kreditausfälle nahezu ausschließen. In diesem Papier zeigen wir 
auch, daß im Kontrast zu theoretischen Ansätzen die dynamischen Anreize zu 
beschränken sind, wenn die zwei Hauptprobleme von Gruppenverträgen, nämlich 
Domino-Effekte und ‚Matching-Probleme‘, ausgeschlossen werden sollen. 